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The regulatory oversight of the private Medicare Advantage (MA) program makes 
the role of competition in this market unclear.  This paper empirically examines 
the impact of competition by measuring the effects of changes in market 
structure on enrollment.  The study examines competition in local geographic 
markets using county-level enrollment data from 2001-07.  I find that an 
increase in the number of competitors results in an increase in the number of 
enrollees served – consistent with competition motivating firms to provide more 
generous benefits.  Competition also results in an increase in product 
proliferation, which highlights a dimension of competition not previously 
examined.  Overall, the results are similar to what one might expect in an 
unregulated environment, suggesting that there are benefits from competition 
that are not realized by regulation alone. 
   1.  Introduction 
The arrival of the baby-boom generation into the Medicare eligible population in 
the next few years creates a greater urgency for understanding the various 
components of the Medicare program.  The Medicare Advantage (MA) program is 
an important part of Medicare, accounting for almost 20% of all Medicare 
eligible individuals in 2007.  The MA program provides Medicare eligible 
individuals the option to forgo the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) plan and 
enroll in a privately administered Medicare HMO or PPO alternative.
1  T h e  
private plans cover all traditional fee-for-service Medicare services (Parts A and 
B) and, in exchange, private insurers receive a payment made from Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).  The insurers enter and offer plans at the 
county level and Medicare also approves plans and sets reimbursement rates by 
county.  The rationale for having a private component to Medicare is that 
private insurers may be more efficient at providing care, which would reduce 
federal Medicare expenditures and provide consumers with more health 
insurance choices.  In addition, competition among private insurers in a county 
may lead to more affordable and generous benefits beyond what is covered 
under traditional FFS Medicare.   
 
The regulatory oversight of CMS makes the role of competition in the MA 
program unclear.  The regulatory powers of CMS include approving plan 
offerings, negotiating the benefit offerings with insurers, and auditing plans.   
While CMS has stated that competition among insurers will generally improve 
the plans offered to consumers, they have also made statements implying that 
CMS has strong regulatory control:  “The Congress … did not leave the 
determination of rates entirely to market forces. We are required to determine 
that the reasonable and equitable test is met and we are given negotiating 
authority to assure this result.”
2    
 
                                                 
1 The traditional fee-for-service insurance plan (“Original Medicare”) consists of part A and part B 
insurance. Part A provides hospital coverage with a 20% coinsurance rate and is free to all 
individuals over age 65 or disabled individuals that have worked 10 years. Part B provides out-
patient (physician) expenses with 20% coinsurance coverage and is available to all over age 65 
and disabled individuals for a monthly premium. 
2 Federal Register January 28, 2005   2
If CMS regulation fully dictates insurer behavior or if other Medicare options 
provide tough competition, then there would be no benefits from competition 
among MA plans and one should not expect any change in market outcomes 
from changes in market structure.  This paper attempts to shed some light on 
the role of competition among MA plans by estimating the effects of competition 
in local geographic markets using enrollment data from 2001-07 from across 
counties nationwide.   
 
This paper contributes to the literature by showing competitive effects in the 
MA regulated environment.  Showing competitive effects is important for at least 
three reasons.  First, it implies that competition leads to improved benefits to 
consumers, confirming a fundamental rationale for the MA program.  Second, it 
shows that antitrust enforcement is important, even in the MA regulated 
environment.  Third, for antitrust investigators, evidence of competition among 
MA insurers demonstrates that the relevant product market may be as narrow 
as MA insurance. 
 
The large change in number of competitors and enrollment over the 2001-07 
period implies that the data is well-suited for measuring competitive effects 
using panel data methods.  Over this time period I observe a total of 480 
entries, 233 exits, and large fluctuations in enrollment.  Nationally, enrollment 
in urban areas drops from about 6 million in 2001 to 5 million in 2003, and 
climbs back to over 6 million in 2007.  As new firms enter and exit the market it 
is possible to observe increases and decreases in market enrollment as insurers 
enter and exit markets.  I employ panel data methods along with instrumental 
variable techniques to identify the effects of competition. 
 
I focus on the effects of competition on enrollment.  While premiums or margins 
provide alternative measures of market performance, enrollment is appealing 
because insurers may respond to changes in competition in a variety of ways 
that a researcher may not predict or observe, including changing premiums, 
benefit structures, marketing efforts, changing provider networks, or 
introducing an entirely new set of products.  It is difficult to examine the impact   3
of competition on each of these strategic variables.  However, the revealed-
preferences of consumers imply that all strategic actions should be reflected in 
the number of enrollees in the market.  In this way, the enrollment reflects 
aspects of competition that are often difficult for both health researchers and 
antitrust authorities to identify.  Moreover, premiums charged by MA insurers 
are often $0, implying that competition is likely to have an effect along other 
dimensions that would be reflected in enrollment, but not premiums charged.3 
 
The results of the paper show that an additional competitor in the local market 
expands overall enrollment.   The econometric estimates reveal that the effects 
of an additional competitor are greatest when there are few competitors, which 
is consistent with the findings in the literature across a variety of industries.4  
For example, in rough terms, the second competitor in the market increases 
total MA enrollment by 25-30% relative to a market with only one MA insurer.
5  
The third competitor increases enrollment relative to a market with only two 
competitors, but the increase is closer to 15-20%.   
 
In addition to market expansion effects, this paper explores a number of other 
aspects of competition that are important for both CMS regulators and antitrust 
authorities.  This paper examines the competitive impact of different sized 
firms.  This is important for antitrust authorities because merging insurance 
companies may argue that fringe firms provide sufficient competitive discipline.  
Although there are plausible reasons to think that fringe firms have a limited 
impact on larger incumbents,6 the actual effect is an empirical question.  My 
                                                 
3 Focusing on just one strategic variable or making an incorrect assumption about the strategic 
variable used by insurers, may incorrectly forecast the effects from changes in competition. 
4 Many papers have suggested this pattern of competition using only entry information.  For 
example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) find this pattern for a variety of professions including 
doctors, dentists, druggists, plumbers and tire dealers; Berry (1992) finds this pattern in the 
airline industry; Dranove et al (2003) observe this pattern for local and national HMOs in the 
commercial insurance market.  Abraham et al (2006) look at competition in local hospital 
markets and use both quantity and entry information and observe that variable profits fall as the 
number of competitors in the market increase, but the effect declines as the number of 
competitors increases.    
5 Throughout this paper, references to the number of MA insurers exclude MA PFFS insurers, as 
explained in Section 3. 
6 First, larger insurers are able to negotiate for provider services at lower costs.   Second, larger 
carriers with a greater number of providers are able to offer more attractive products with   4
results suggest that fringe carriers provide much less competitive benefit 
relative to larger insurers.  Specifically, I find that the market expansion effect 
of the first few fringe insurers is roughly 7%-8% while the first few large 
competitors have an expansion effect of roughly 20% to 30%. 
 
The paper is structured in the following way:  Section 2 reviews the literature; 
Section 3 discusses the conceptual framework that relates enrollment to 
competition; Section 4 discusses the data; Section 5 describes the econometric 
analysis and results; and Section 6 concludes. 
 
  2.  Literature Review 
This paper is most closely related to the work of Pizer and Frakt (2002) who use 
a natural experiment to examine the impact of competition on particular plan 
benefits in the MA markets, which was called Medicare+Choice at the time of 
their study.  They examine how premiums and benefits change when the 
government unexpectedly increases reimbursements paid to insurers.  They 
find that plans in less concentrated markets had a larger increase in benefits 
and lower premiums, relative to more concentrated markets.  My paper differs 
from theirs because it examines the competitive impact on enrollment, which 
reflects changes in all benefits and other strategic variables that may be 
affected by competition.  In addition, I allow for the competitive effect to vary by 
size and number of firms, which allows me to examine the effect of competition 
for a variety of industry structures as additional competitors enter or exit a 
market. 
 
Competition in insurance markets has also been examined in the commercial 
sector.  Wholey et al (1995) examine the effects of market structure on HMO 
premiums in the commercial HMO market.  They find that additional HMO 
competitors reduce HMO premiums.  Feldman and Wholey (1996) focus on the 
effect of mergers on commercial HMO premiums and find that mergers have no 
                                                                                                                                                 
extensive networks.  Third, larger carriers tend to offer a greater number of products, implying 
they will be a closer competitor to a greater number of firms.     5
effect on premiums, suggesting that economies of scale from mergers are either 
small or cannot be distinguished from other observations in the data. 
 
Aside from Pizer and Fract, there are relatively few papers that have examined 
the supply side of the MA market.  Those that have looked at the supply side 
first estimate demand and make behavioral assumptions to recover the cost 
parameters of the firms.7  For example, Town and Liu (2003) estimate the 
demand for MA products to calculate total welfare from the availability of these 
products.  In calculating welfare effects, they assume a Bertrand-Nash pricing 
game in premiums to determine marginal costs and assume free entry to 
calculate fixed costs.  With these assumptions, they find significant welfare 
benefits from MA plans.  Both Maruyama (2006) and Lustig (2007) also assume 
a Bertrand-Nash pricing game in analyzing the supply side of the market.  
 
My paper is complementary to these very structural papers, which presume 
that insurers may act competitively in a particular structural framework (i.e. 
static Bertrand-Nash pricing) and are unconstrained by CMS regulators.  My 
paper confirms a correlation between competition and enrollment that is 
consistent with insurers competing.  I find both enrollment expansion effects 
similar to what one should expect in an unregulated environment.  These 
results suggest that the Bertrand-Nash pricing might be a reasonable 
assumption of firm behavior, although it does not appear that price is the only 
dimension in which firms compete.  This paper shows that product proliferation 
appears to be a dimension of competition that has not been accounted for in 
previous work. 8 
                                                 
7 Much of the previous empirical literature examining the MA market estimates the demand for 
MA products.  For instance, Town and Liu (2003) use information on plan characteristics 
combined with aggregate enrollment data to estimate a nested-logit differentiated product 
demand model.   Other papers have estimated similar nested-logit demand model including 
Lustig (2007), Hall (2007), Maruyama (2006), and Dafny and Dranove (2005) using aggregate 
data, and Atherly, Dowd and Feldman (2004) using consumer level data.   In general, estimates 
from these papers imply that consumers are sensitive to changes in the premiums of MA 
products, as well as other characteristics of the product, and that MA products are more similar 
to each other than to original Medicare.   
 
8 This last finding has implications for instrumental variable approaches used in estimating 
structural demand models.  In particular, the common assumption that rival product 
characteristics are uncorrelated with the unobserved quality of the plan may be violated in this 
market   6
 
3. Conceptual  Framework 
The analysis presented in this paper is a reduced form analysis of the effect of 
competition on enrollment in MA markets.  This analysis is distinct from most 
reduced form studies of competition that focus on the effect on price or some 
other strategic variable of the firm, while this paper focuses on the effect on 
quantity.  Therefore, it is useful to discuss the mechanism of how I expect 
competition to effect quantity and how the effect might be interpreted.  
 
I view insurers as competing for a quality-adjusted price, p, for MA products.  
The quality adjusted price reflects benefits, the premium, the network and other 
choice variables of the insurer that affect the insurers perceived quality.   
Consumer utility is affected by the number of insurers in the market, N, as 
insurers compete by lowering the quality-adjusted price, p(N).   A reduction in, 
p, has an impact on the probability that an individual consumer selects a MA 
product, q(p(N)).  Therefore, all else equal, an increase in the number of firms, 
N, should reduce the quality-adusted price and the probability that a consumer 
chooses a MA product should increase.  That is, Dq/DN=(Dq/Dp)*(Dp/DN) and 
since Dp/DN<0 and Dq/Dp<0 we should expect that Dq/DN>0.   
 
With one additional assumption, the model may also be informative regarding how the 
quality-adjusted price changes as the number of competitors in the market increases.  In 
particular, if we take the derivative of the log of individual demand we find 
d(log(q(p(N))))/dN=(1/q*dq/dp)*(dp/dN).  In the case that the semi-elasticity, 
(1/q*dq/dp), is a constant, c, then d(log(q(p(N))))/dN=c*(dp/dN), the percentage impact 
on quantity is proportional to the impact on price.  Even if the semi-elasticity is not 
constant, one might view this as an approximation, as long as the market semi-elasticity 
does not change significantly as the market price changes.   The effect of competition on 
total enrollment follows similarly.
9  The literature on entry and competition in other 
                                                 
9 Let the market size be, S, then the number of enrollees in MA products is equal to Q(N)=Sq(p(N)) so that 
log(Q(N))=log(S)+log(q(p(N))).  Therefore, similar to the effect when looking at individual 
demand, the effect on market enrollment is d(log(Q(N)))/dN=d(log(q(p(N))))/dN= 
(1/q*dq/dp)*(dp/dN).   7
industries suggests that each additional competitor might have a diminishing effect on 
market price.  Therefore, if MA markets are similar to other competitive industries, one 
should expect the competitive impact on the probability of selecting an MA product to 
decline with the number of insurers in the market.    
 
While this section provides an overview of the expected effect of competition on 
enrollment, it does not discuss how this effect will be identified.  Both the number of 
insurers and enrollment are endogenous, which complicates the identification of a 
competitive effect.  A more complete review of how the empirical approach for 
identifying the effects of competition is discussed in greater detail after reviewing the 
data used in this study. 
 
4.  Data 
The primary data used in the analysis is publicly available enrollment data from 
Medicare.  The data contains monthly information by county and plan from 
2001-07.10    The data includes the number of individual enrollees in a product 
within a county, the number of eligible members in a county, the type of 
products sold, and the name of the carrier selling the product.11  The data is 
supplemented with Medicare Ratebook information that lists the Medicare 
benchmark rate for the county; the benchmark rate is the primary determinant 
of insurers reimbursement.  The data is also supplemented with Census data.  
The Census data provides estimates of the population over age 65 and 
information that allows us to match counties with MSAs.12 
 
  Sample 
The analysis focuses on markets that may be large enough to support a local 
HMO or PPO product.  I select markets that have an initial Medicare eligible 
population of 6,500 or more, which is roughly equivalent to counties with total 
                                                 
 
10 The primary data is at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/home/rsds.asp.  
11 I also consider changes in ownership over time.  For instance, I mark products owned by 
Pacificare as owned by United after their merger.   
12 The data is available at http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html.   8
populations of about 40,000.  I also select markets that begin with some 
positive level of enrollment in an MA plan of any type in 2001.
13   
 
The MA program has gone through a number of important changes over the 
2001 to 2007 period of the sample, primarily caused by the passage of the 
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003.  It added regional PPOs, created a new 
system for proposing insurance plans, instituted a bidding system that partially 
determines payments to MA insurers, and created the prescription drug 
component (part D).  Although these changes have had an impact on the types 
of services offered and the administrative procedures followed by insurers, both 
the competition among plans and the regulatory oversight of CMS has been a 
constant presence.  Throughout the 2001 to 2007 period private insurers have 
been free to propose benefit plans of their choosing, and CMS has maintained 
the power to reject proposed plans. 
 
The geographic market in this paper is defined as the county.  Plans are 
regulated and administered at the county level.  Both the oversight of the plans 
and Medicare rates paid to insurers are determined at the county level.  In 
addition, when insurers enter a county they must offer the same plan to all 
individuals in that county.
14 
 
Although the data is available monthly, I look at only a single month in each 
year.  This timing corresponds to consumers making enrollment decisions on 
an annual basis.  I choose the month of October in each year.   The analysis 
focuses on competition among local HMO and PPO products.  The Private Fee 
For Service plans have recently become more popular, but they are more 




                                                 
13 The primary results presented below are robust to alternative samples chosen.  For instance, I 
obtain similar results if I estimate the models below using a sample of all areas with more than 
30,000 eligible individuals. 
14 Additional robustness checks were performed where only the largest county in each MSA was 
selected, and I found similar results.   9
  Variables 
The analysis that follows uses a variety of variables produced from these data.  
The following is a simple listing of variables and definitions that are used 
throughout the analysis: 
 
Enrollees -  This is the number of enrollees in a local HMO/PPO plan for a 
carrier in a month.15 
 
Eligible – The predicted number of Medicare eligible individuals in a county in a 
month.16 
 
MA Rate – The statutory benchmark set by Medicare for the part A and B 
component of the MA bid.  This is an important determinant of the amount 
private insurers are paid to provide coverage for Medicare enrollees.17  The rate 
is adjusted to 2007 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
 
C o m p e t i t o r  –  I  d e f i n e  a  c o m p e t i t o r  a s  a  c a r r i e r  w i t h  5 %  o r  m o r e  o f  t h e  M A  
enrollees that purchase a local HMO or PPO product and have at least 100 
enrollees.18 
 
Fringe competitor – I define a fringe competitor as a carrier with at least 100 
enrollees, but less than 5% of the market share. 
 
                                                 
15 This also includes local demonstration plans and cost based plans that appear to be offered 
locally as HMOs.  These other plans make up a very small percentage of the MA market.  This 
definition excludes Private FFS plans and Regional PPOs. 
16 The number of eligible individuals is only available until 2005 from the Medicare website.  
Census estimates provide population figures for individuals aged 65+ from 2001-06.  I predict 
2006 and 2007 eligibility figures based on county levels in 2006 and county level trends for 2007. 
17Prior to 2006, the benchmark was the payment that Medicare offered to insurers for providing 
coverage to enrollees.  In 2006 and later, the role of the benchmark changed so that insurers that 
bid below the benchmark are able to provide this cost savings to consumers as extra benefit.  
More precisely, if the bid is below the benchmark, the insurers return 75% of the difference as 
extra benefits to consumers.   The local benchmarks are calculated as the maximum of the 
following amounts:  (1)  National county floors (there is one for rural and one for urban) (2) 50/50 
blend of national and local healthcare rates (3) Original Medicare costs for the county. 
18 A variety of reasonable definitions of “competitor” were explored and the results presented here 
have proven to be robust across definitions.    10
Penetration – The fraction of the eligible population enrolled in a MA HMO or 
PPO-type plans. 
 
Proliferation – Number of contracts offered in the market minus the number of 
competitors in the market.  By subtracting the number of competitors from the 
number of products offered, I focus on additional contracts offered in the 
market.  I only look at additional product offerings, because it is obviously the 
case that an entrant must offer at least one product in the market.  If each firm 
offers a single contract then the product proliferation variable is 0.19   
 
  Descriptive Statistics 
Before analyzing competition, I begin with some graphs and tables that show 
some recent trends in the MA market.  Figure 1 presents the national 
enrollment in coordinated care plans along with the statutory benchmark rates 
paid to insurers over the 2001-07 time period.  The enrollment is shown in the 
sold line with enrollment in millions shown along the left vertical axis.  The 
benchmark rate is shown in a dotted line with the dollar figure shown on the 
right vertical axis. 
 
                                                 
19 The number of contracts in the market is a proxy for the actual number of products.  There 
may, if fact, be a number of products per contract so the number of products tend to be greater 
than the number of contracts.  However, it seems that plans offered under the same contract are 
typically similar, suggesting that the number of contracts may be a better proxy for variety offered 
in the marketplace.   11


















































The graph displays a large change in enrollment over time.
20   E n r o l l m e n t  
initially declines and then begins to increase in 2003 at the time of the passage 
of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003.  One can see that the passage of the 
act corresponds to a large increase in benchmark rates paid to MA carriers.  
The rates increased by 10% above the overall CPI from 2003 to 2004, while in 
the prior two years the growth was less than 2%.  The large increase in rates 
reflected the goals of policymakers to encourage plan participation and expand 
access to plans, and did not necessarily reflect changes in medical costs at the 
time.  As evidence of this policy shift, note that the CPI for medical care services 
ranged between 2-3% above the overall CPI for this same period.    This 
supports that idea that changing reimbursement rates to insurers reflect 
changes in national policy rather than changes in the underlying costs of 
medical services.   
 
Table 1 below shows the net entry and exits in markets for both competitors 
and fringe carriers. The entry and exit table show several expected patterns that 
                                                 
20 Note that the enrollment figures include only HMO and PPO plan types, which make up a vast majority 
of enrollment in urban areas.   12
match changes in enrollment shown in figure 1 above.  First, in the beginning 
of the sample there are a large number of exits that corresponds to the period in 
which enrollment levels are falling and MA benchmark rates are relatively low.   
In 2003 there is a sharp reduction in the number of exits from the market, 
accompanied by a large increase in the number of entrants. The table shows a 
large number of competitors entering the market and few exits from 2004 on 
corresponding to an increase in MA rates and an overall growth in enrollment.  
Looking at fringe competitors, there is a very similar pattern, although with 
fewer exits in 2002 relative to the larger competitors.   
 
Table 1:  Net Changes in Number of Competitors
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Competitor Entry 24 34 41 94 161 126 480
Competitor Exit 124 31 25 12 31 10 233
Finge Entry 30 17 36 71 151 105 410
Fringe Exit 39 19 14 16 35 36 159  
 
The large number of cases of entry and exit shown in Table 1 is important 
because I identify the effects of competition by observing changes in enrollment 
as the number of competitors and fringe firms in a market change.   
 
While Table 1 and Figure 1 provide some information on the overall trends and 
changes in the market, Table 2 provides a recent snapshot of the MA market in 
2007.   The first column shows the number of competitors in the market and 
the corresponding row shows the average characteristic in markets with that 
number of competitors.  For instance, the second column shows the eligible 
population is greater in markets with more entrants.  The third column shows 
higher average rates in markets with more competitors.  The table shows that 
markets with more competitors typically have more enrollment and penetration.   
In addition, markets with more competitors seem to offer a greater number of 
products. 
   13












1 21,395 $736.78 2,027 7.9% 0.4 162
2 36,210 $756.67 7,057 18.4% 1.3 240
3 74,013 $786.06 15,951 21.1% 2.1 106
4 61,583 $781.23 13,927 22.1% 2.3 55
5 140,715 $837.20 43,347 29.2% 4.4 25
6 156,443 $804.18 63,504 29.0% 5.1 7
7 81,400 $732.04 6,236 7.7% 5.0 1  
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest that competitive forces are at work 
in MA markets.  First, markets with a greater number of competitors are 
typically larger and have higher MA rates, which is consistent with insurers 
entering markets that have greater demand.  Second, penetration and 
enrollment is higher in markets with more competitors.  It is important to note 
that the table does not show a direction of causality.  That is, one cannot tell 
from Table 2 whether competition leads to greater enrollment, or whether firms 
are attracted to markets that are more receptive to MA products.   
 
There is a large assortment of market structures in these data.   Table 3 below 
shows the observed market structures over the 2001-07 time period.  The left 
hand side of the table shows the number of competitors, while the top of the 
table shows the number of fringe firms.  The counts of competitors and fringe 
firms is greatest for those markets with between 1 and 4 competitors and 
between 0 to 3 fringe firms, which account for over 95% of the observations.  
 
Table 3:  Observed Market Configurations in the 2001-2007 Time Period
0123 4  o r  m o r e T o t a l
1 1,441 59 14 1 0 1,515
2 1,118 156 60 23 11 1,368
3 353 126 45 9 4 537
4 159 49 10 6 19 243
5 or More 26 20 15 27 31 119
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  4.  Econometric Model and Results 
This section discusses the econometric model used to explain the effect of 
competition on market outcomes.  The basic empirical model is simply a 
regression of the number of competitors on log enrollment.  The goal of the 
model is to isolate the impact of a change in competition on enrollment.  The 
regression used in the analysis is: 
 
it i t t i
it it it it it
State Time Time County
Rate MA Eligible g Fringe Num s Competitor Num f enrollment Log
ε
β β
+ − + + +
+ = ) , ( ) . , . ( ) ( 1 0  
The first set of variables ) . , . ( it it Fringe Num s Competitor Num f , captures the 
competition between carriers.  The second group of variables, 
) , ( it it Rate MA Eligible g , captures the change in enrollment as the size of the 
market changes, where the size of the market is affected by the size of the 
eligible population and the statutory benchmark rate set by Medicare.  The 
variables  i County ,  t Time , and  State Timet −  are county, time, and time-state fixed 
effects.  The error term is  it ε  and  3 2 1 and , , β β β are parameters to be estimated. 
 
Typically using simple regression analysis produces biased estimates.   
Specifically, a selection bias can arise if there are unaccounted for demand or 
marginal cost factors that jointly affect both enrollment and the number of 
firms in the market.  I control for the selection bias applying both fixed effects 
and instrumental variable techniques.
 21   
 
As argued above, much of the entry and exit observed in the data is caused by a 
known exogenous policy change affecting MA rates, limiting the role of 
unobserved marginal cost or demand shocks that could potentially affect entry 
and enrollment and bias the estimates.  By including time dummies that 
capture changes in national policy along with local MA rates and county fixed 
                                                 
21 I follow the work of Evans, Froeb and Werden (1993)  and Davis (2005, 2006) that control for 
endogeneity in two ways.  First, the panel structure of the data accounts for factors that affect 
equilibrium selection that are invariant over time.  Second, instrumenting accounts for any 
remaining effects of endogeneity or measurement error that may cause imprecision in the 
estimates.     15
effects, the analysis has controlled for many of the important factors that affect 
entry and exit in MA markets over the studied time period.  Therefore, one 
might argue that the fixed-effect estimates without instrumenting provide 
precise unbiased estimates of the competitive effects. 
 
However, it is possible that endogeneity bias could arise from demand or 
marginal cost factors that may be correlated with both the number of 
competitors and enrollees.  If county fixed-effects are included along with state-
time dummies, then for a potential bias to exist it is necessary for changes in 
marginal cost or demand factors specific to a county to be correlated with entry 
and enrollment in that county.22  To correct for this potential problem I need 
instruments that are uncorrelated with changes in unobserved marginal cost or 
demand in the county, but correlated with the number of competitors in the 
market.  A variable that captures the fixed cost from entering a market would 
be ideal because fixed costs affect the number of firms in the market, but do 
not affect marginal cost or demand.   
  
The instrument used in this paper is the average number of MA carriers in 
other counties of the state.  The reason this is an appropriate instrument is 
that there are shared fixed costs from entering geographic regions including 
establishing a contract with a large provider in an area or shared administrative 
facilities in an area.23  The number of competitors in a state may also be 
correlated if changes in state regulation commonly affecting fixed costs of entry.  
For instance, fixed costs associated with obtaining a state HMO license. Note 
that including state-time fixed effects may be important for this instrumenting 
                                                 
22In other words, after accounting for all factors that commonly affect enrollment across the state 
that also affect quantity, I should expect for the only remaining correlation in the number of firms 
to be related to common fixed costs from entry.  If all factors affecting entry are common across 
the state or if all fixed costs are local, then I should expect a change in the number of firms in the 
rest of the state to be poorly correlated with the number of firms within a county and the 
instrument will produce insignificant results. 
23 The underlying assumption is that demand for healthcare services and marginal costs for 
healthcare are local, while many components of fixed costs are shared across larger geographic 
regions.     16
strategy to work because it ensures that common changes in marginal cost that 
might affect entry and enrollment across the state are netted out.24   
 
a.  Market Expansion Effects – Enrollment 
I estimate a series of models showing the effect of market structure on 
enrollment.  The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 4 below.  
The first column of the table lists the variables and the remaining columns 
show parameter estimates and t-stats of various regression models.  I begin 
with a baseline OLS specification of the above model that leaves out market 
fixed effect dummies.  I find that the effect of market structure on enrollment is 
positive and highly significant.   The first model predicts that the second large 
competitor increases enrollment in the market by over 84%; however, without 
controlling demand and cost effects specific to the market, I cannot be certain 
of the direction of causality in the model.  That is, I cannot tell whether firms 
enter the market because enrollment in the county is high, or whether 
enrollment is high because of competition.  If bias exists I should expect that 
demand and marginal cost changes would bias coefficients upward because 
positive demand shocks and negative marginal cost shocks will induce entry 
and increase total enrollment.   
 
In the model Fixed Effect (1), I control for county level fixed effects that account 
for equilibrium selection problems specific to a county.  The coefficient on the 
competitors drops considerably relative to the OLS regression analysis.  The 
effect of the second competitor on enrollment is about 36.3%.  Fixed Effect (1) 
also shows that the fringe competitors have an impact on competition.   
Specifically, the first small competitor in the market increases enrollment by 
about 15.5%, but the marginal effect of an additional fringe firm is much 
smaller, with the second fringe firm having an impact of just 2.2%.  Each 
additional competitor, both small and large, has a diminishing marginal effect 
on enrollment.   
 
                                                 
24 The traditional instrument used in this type of analysis is a lag of the market structure (E.g. 
number of firms or Herfindahl), but this approach does not work well in the presence of serial 
correlation.   17
The second model, Fixed Effect (2), adds an interaction of the number of large 
competitors and number of small competitors to account for the fact that as the 
number of competitors increases the marginal output from additional fringe 
firms should be less.  I find the expected negative coefficient on this interaction.  
Fixed Effect (2) also includes state specific time trends.  These state specific 
trends account for changes specific to a state that might affect enrollment such 
as changes in medical cost or regional variation in demand.  After accounting 
for these additional state specific trends, one can see that the results are 
qualitatively similar to those found without these state specific trends.     
Specifically, the first large competitor has a large effect on demand and 
additional rivals have much smaller effects.25   
Table 4:  Expansion Effects - Regressions on Log(Market Enrollment)
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
2nd Competitor 0.842 (14.59) 0.363 (10.06) 0.275 (8.55)
3rd Competitor 0.237 (4.44) 0.244 (7.51) 0.170 (5.99)
4th or More Comp.*(#Comp. - 3) 0.098 (2.48) 0.159 (3.54) 0.204 (4.18)
1st Fringe 0.622 (11.61) 0.155 (5.06) 0.145 (5.21)
2nd Fringe 0.291 (4.01) 0.022 (0.55) 0.016 (0.38)
3rd Fringe 0.119 (1.34) 0.029 (0.83) 0.062 (1.29)
4th or More Fringe.*(#Fringe - 3) 0.140 (5.66) 0.056 (3.21) 0.071 (2.55)
# Competitors*# Fringe -0.017 (-1.67)
Log(MA Rate) 7.943 (5.17) 2.741 (1.73) 0.940 (0.66)
Log(Eligible) 5.973 (6.04) 2.598 (3.12) 1.101 (1.41)
Log(Eligible)*Log(MA Rate) -0.784 (-5.19) -0.351 (-2.57) -0.136 (-1.07)
Constant -53.112 (-5.29) -13.338 (-1.37)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
State & Time Dummies No No Yes
County Fixed-Effects No Yes Yes
Rho 0.935 0.965
R-Squared (Within) 0.282 0.580
R-Squared (Between) 0.695 0.337
R-Squared (Overall) 0.743 0.667 0.367
Number of Observations 3668 3668 3668
Number of Groups 643 643 643
OLS Fixed Effect (1) Fixed Effect (2)
 
                                                 
25 To check if these results appear to hold in the current MA environment, I also estimate an 
entry model that includes only the last three years of data.  I find very similar results to those 
presented in the model Fixed Effect (3).   18
Next I examine instrumental variable estimates.  For the instrumental variable 
estimates I change the specification of the model slightly.  Specifically, I make 
the competitive effects variable continuous rather than discrete, but allow for 
flexibility in how output changes with the number of competitors by including 
competitors and competitors squared.  This transformation allows us to match 
the continuous nature of the instruments and also to reduce the number of 
variables that must be explained by the chosen instruments.  Table 6 below 
shows the results from this instrumenting strategy.  The model Fixed Effect (4) 
in table 6 estimates the model without instrumenting, but including the 
nonlinear competitive effects.  The IV Fixed Effect (1) is the same as Fixed Effect 
(4), but instruments are applied.26  There is little qualitative difference in the 
two specifications.  However, a Hausman test for endogeneity suggests that 
there is an endogeneity problem.  Another noticeable difference in the two 
estimates is that the significance of the t-statistics fall in the IV Fixed Effect 
model, which may be caused by an expected loss of efficiency from the IV 
procedure.  The IV regression suggests that a second competitor in the market 
increases enrollment by 24%.27  
 
                                                 
26 The specific instruments include the average number of competitors in other counties, the 
average number of competitors in other counties squared, the average number of fringe 
competitors in other counties, the average number of fringe competitors squared and the 
interaction of these instruments.  I also include a dummy variable for whether the average 
number of competitors is greater than one and whether the average number of fringe firms is 
greater than one. 
27 23% =25.4*(1)-2.4*(1^2)   19
Table 5:  Expansion Effects  - Regressions on Log(Market Enrollment)
Coef. t Coef. t
# Competitors 0.254 (13.84) 0.279 (7.52)
# Competitors^2 -0.013 (-2.83) -0.036 (-3.31)
# Fringe Competitors 0.078 (4.91) 0.100 (3.67)
# Fringe Competitors^2 -0.006 (-2.52) -0.018 (-4.05)
Log(MA Rate) 1.234 (1.65) 0.221 (0.27)
Log(Eligible) 1.292 (2.91) 0.642 (1.32)
Log(Eligible)*Log(MA Rate) -0.164 (-2.43) -0.064 (-0.87)
State & Time Dummies Yes Yes
Rho 0.965 0.965
R-Squared (Within) 0.576 0.562
R-Squared (Between) 0.350 0.311
R-Squared (Overall) 0.384 0.354
# Observations 3668 3668
# Groups 643 643
Fixed Effect (4) IV Fixed Effect (1)
 
 
Although the estimates above are indicative of consumer benefits from 
competition, it is unclear how these expansion effects might translate into 
savings.  For instance, if demand for MA products is highly elastic then 
expansion effects may be large, but benefits to consumers may be small.   
Estimates from Atherly, Dowd and Feldman (2004) suggest that the own-price 
elasticity of demand between MA products and traditional Medicare is about -
.64 suggesting an expansion effect of 20% would correspond to a decrease in 
price of 31% (=.20/.64).  More recently, Dunn (2009) estimates the elasticity 
between MA products and traditional Medicare to be –3.8, implying a price 
effect of 6.2%=(.20/3.19).  Clearly both these predictions of competition on 
quality-adjusted price are quite crude and more work is needed to directly 
measure the effect of competition on consumer welfare.  
 
  b.  Market Expansion Effects - Product Proliferation 
As noted in the introduction of the paper, firms may compete on a number of 
dimensions.  In this section, I examine how the number of competitors in the 
market affects the number of insurance contracts offered.  Before proceeding   20
with the analysis, I first examine some descriptive statistics.  Table 6 below 
shows a tabulation of the proliferation variable.  The left hand column shows 
the possible values of the proliferation variable observed in the data, the second 
column shows the frequency of markets in which I observe that value, and the 
third column shows the percent of markets where I observe that frequency.   It 
is important to note that 58% of markets have no product proliferation, 
implying that each carrier in the market has a single contract.  The high 
fraction of markets with zero proliferation suggests that the error term will not 
be normally distributed and that a standard regression approach will be 
inappropriate.  Therefore, in analyzing the effect of competition on product 
proliferation I apply commonly used count regression techniques. 
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In the regression analysis shown in Table 7 below I assume that the error term 
has a Poisson distribution.  In the first regression I show a simple Poisson 
regression without state or county fixed effects, but including a time trend.  The 
analysis looks quite similar to the market expansion effects shown in the 
previous subsection.  In particular, I find that additional competitors increase 
product proliferation, but that this effect declines as the number of competitors   21
in the market increases.  The second competitor in the marketplace increases 
product proliferation in the marketplace by around 65%28.  In addition, I find 
that larger competitors have a greater effect than smaller ones.  However, the 
expansion effect declines as the number of competitors in the market increases.  
The dummy variables included in the model show a clear time trend for product 
proliferation, showing that, all else equal, the number of products available in 
the market has steadily increased since 2001.   
 
It is important to note that the same potential biases that occur in the 
enrollment regressions may also have an impact on product proliferation.  To 
correct for these potential problems I include state and county fixed effects in 
Poisson regression (2) and FE Poisson, respectively.  Including these fixed 
effects results in smaller market expansion effects for both the number of 
competitors and number of fringe firms.  However, the results still show that 
the larger competitors have the greatest impact on product proliferation and 
that this effect declines as the number of competitors in the market grows.29   
 
                                                 
28 (=71.9%*1-8%*(1^2)) 
29 The nonlinearity of the poisson model makes it more difficult to include additional fixed effects 
or to apply instrumental variable techniques, so these additional robustness checks are not 
applied.  However, if the enrollment expansion effects above are an indicator, then I may not 
expect the above results to change when an IV approach is applied.   22
Table 7:  Expansion Effects  - Regressions on Proliferation
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
# Competitors 0.743 (11.17) 0.497 (9.86) 0.445 (5.12)
# Competitors^2 -0.093 (-6.88) -0.058 (-5.82) -0.030 (-1.83)
# Fringe Competitors 0.215 (6.31) 0.207 (6.47) 0.090 (1.85)
# Fringe Competitors^2 -0.013 (-4.52) -0.012 (-3.55) -0.005 (-0.94)
Log(MA Rate) -2.943 (-1.38) 0.523 (0.32) -9.402 (-3.01)
Log(Eligible) -1.665 (-1.27) 0.112 (0.11) -3.549 (-1.99)
Log(Eligible)*Log(MA Rate) 0.282 (1.42) 0.022 (0.15) 0.601 (2.21)
Constant 15.028 (1.07)
Year  Dummies Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed-Effects No Yes No
County Fixed-Effects No No Yes
Log likelihood -3345.6 -2869.2 -1758.9
`
Number of Observations 3726 3540 2815
Number of Groups 671 39 435
FE Poisson Poisson (1) Poisson (2)
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper directly analyzes the effect of competition on enrollment in MA 
markets.  Estimates presented here provide evidence of market expansion 
effects by showing that additional competitors in the market grow overall 
enrollment.    The results also suggest that benefits to competition decline with 
the number of competitors, as is found in a number of other industries.  The 
paper also provides evidence that an increase in the number of insurers in a 
market increases the proliferation of products offered.  This result is interesting 
because product proliferation may be an important dimension of competition 
that has not been accounted for in previous work.   The descriptive analysis 
presented here suggests that a theory of competition that considers the 
strategic decision to introduce a new product may be an important direction for 
future research. 
 
Overall the analysis presented here suggests that competition among MA 
insurers does matter despite the regulated environment, especially the first few 
MA competitors.  However, there are many aspects of competition that require 
further study.  First, although this study highlights that there are benefits to   23
competition, the estimates do not quantify how much competition matters to 
consumers or how consumers benefit with more competitors.  Second, the 
study analyzes the effects of additional entry, but does not look at what factors 
affect entry such as government payments to MA insurers.  It may be of interest 
to policy-makers to compare the benefits of competition to the additional cost to 
the government to induce entry by increasing MA rates.  Third, the estimates 
presented here are unbiased if both the fixed effects and IV techniques 
effectively control for endogeneity.  To explore the accuracy of the results 
presented here, one may want to explore alternative approaches for identifying 






                                                 
30 For example, Abraham, Gaynor and Vogt (2007) control for entry selection in examining the effects of 
competition using a structural entry model for hospitals.   24
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